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8 April 1966

VIEWS ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION

By

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SUMMARY

For the past 20 years US policy toward Germany has played the dominant role in developing West Germany's present economic, political, military, and divided situation.

During the Allied conferences which set the stage for the post-war period of occupation, the United States failed to recognize the nature of Soviet designs to bring a weakened Germany into the Communist orbit. Soviet intransigency, however, soon made those designs apparent, and the United States abandoned its earlier policies designed to keep Germany an ineffective, defeated nation. The United States embarked on a systematic rebuilding of the economy in that portion of the former German nation under Western influence. In the process of developing West Germany into a dominant economic nation in Europe, the United States fostered the revival of West Germany's political and military capacities.

Today West Germany's economy is based on the best principles of free enterprise; its government is democratic; and its military forces are aligned with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the defense of Western Europe. East Germany, in the meantime, has developed under socialistic economic principles and Communist political guidance, and its military forces are incorporated into the Soviet Bloc alliance.

Despite the pre-eminence of the former occupation wards, they remain just as thoroughly divided, if not more so, than when the victorious Allies dismembered Germany in 1945. For, throughout the years, US and USSR policies have reflected a reluctance to agree to reunification under conditions that would relinquish their respective parts of Germany to the opposing camp. Maintaining the security in Europe, by preserving the balance of power, has been the governing element of US policy toward reunification of Germany. The United States has entertained, but rejected, proposals for demilitarization and neutrality of Germany as a price for German unity.

The West German Government proclaims dual goals of German reunification and recovery of the former German lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers, and the United States continues publicly to support their achievement. However, popular support for the latter goal appears to be losing ground among the German people. With or without West German recognition, the Oder-Neisse frontier appears to be growing in permanence, and the loss of the lands to the east inevitable. The Soviets hold the key to reunification and do not appear to be ready to agree to German unity in other than unacceptable terms.

The events of the past 20 years impinging on the German reunification problem are many, and show no promise of significantly

decreasing in the future. It appears that the United States will continue to be confronted with a choice between policies which will unite Germany and those which will preserve the security in Europe. The thesis of this paper is that the United States cannot embrace the first choice at the expense of the latter.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Twenty years ago the United States and the other Allied powers emerged victorious in a great conflict with Nazi Germany. The first impulse of many, maybe most, Americans was to insure that the Germans never rose again to threaten the peace of the world. To this end the United States embraced policies designed to eliminate the war potential of Germany. The United States indorsed, in fact proposed, policies which would result in the division and emasculation of this once proud nation. Still, the United States wanted to leave Germany with enough to exist at minimum standards, and planned for the ultimate restoration of Germany as a political entity. Belatedly, it was recognized that not all the Allies shared the same altruistic beliefs. One, at least, intended to exploit completely the prostrate Germany and gain revenge for past injustices.

In those early days, only faintly discernible in the background, came an awareness that Germany was to be the meeting ground in the ideological conflict between the opposing forces of communism and democracy. The primary protagonists in the conflict controlled potentially powerful forces in their parts of divided Germany. It appeared that reunification of Germany could only be achieved by one side abandoning its sector of Germany to the other--with the inevitable shift in the balance of power.

Given the conditions under which reunification could be achieved, the problem for the United States has been to determine the relative merit of available courses of action. Should moralistic values prevail in formulating US policy toward the defeated, or should a "hard line" be pursued which serves to blunt the advance of communism in Europe? The question, then, is whether US policies toward Germany and its reunification have been in the best interests of the United States, and, incidentally, in the best interests of West Germany.

PURPOSE

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the reunification problem from various aspects. The thesis reviews briefly, for their impact on the problem, those events of recent history, such as the Yalta, Teheran, and Potsdam Conferences, West Germany's establishment as the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and its subsequent integration into NATO. The paper examines the significance of economic development in West and East Germany, and the bearing which this development has had, and will continue to have, on German unity. Finally, the thesis explores various elements of the reunification problem for their impact on the defense of Europe. It analyzes West German, United States, and Soviet policies and interests in relation to Germany's borders, proposals for disengagement and neutralization of Germany, and nuclear participation by West Germany. Throughout, the thesis assesses the value of US policy in regard to its effectiveness in maintaining the security of Europe.

LIMITATION OF THESIS

Although the question of Berlin is an important facet of US policy in Germany, it is not discussed in this thesis. The security and status of Berlin are problems beyond the scope of this paper and deserve separate analysis.

CHAPTER 2

REUNIFICATION PROBLEM: LEGACY OF THE PAST

The present reunification problem in Germany had its beginning two years before the end of World War II in discussions between President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin, and Prime Minister Churchill (the "Big Three"). Through a series of meetings at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, the Allied leaders and their staffs reached general agreement on zones of occupation, boundaries, and postwar policies for the occupation of Germany. The reunification problem was compounded by these conferences and events of the postwar era, including the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany and its entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This chapter reviews briefly the significance of these events in relation to the reunification problem.

TEHERAN CONFERENCE

The division of Germany gained form in 1943 at the Teheran Conference when the "Big Three" discussed possible postwar division of Germany. Although no decision was reached, Roosevelt proposed the partition of Germany into five states. Churchill believed that the German provinces of Prussia should be isolated from the German nation, and then the southern portion of Germany should be formed into a Danubian Confederation. Stalin preferred a plan for the partition of Germany, something like Roosevelt's plan. However, he insisted that

Germany should, at all costs, be broken up so that it could not reunite.¹ While agreement was reached on the need to render Germany harmless, no decisions were made as to the means of maintaining this condition.

YALTA CONFERENCE

At the next meeting of the "Big Three" in February 1945, at Yalta, discussions were resumed, and agreement was reached that Germany was to be dismembered in the interests of future peace and security. The actual method of dismemberment was to be worked out by a special committee.² The formal conclusions of the Conference agreed that Britain, United States, and the Soviet Union would take such steps, including the complete disarmament, demilitarization, and dismemberment of Germany as they deemed requisite for future peace and security.³ It was at Yalta that the present controversy over the Oder-Neisse border with Poland had its beginning. Poland, and how to settle its frontiers, was a topic of discussion at most of the eight plenary sessions of the Yalta Conference. Stalin and Molotov had paved the way for a Polish state oriented toward Russia, and one whose western borders reached to the lines of the Oder and western Neisse Rivers.⁴

¹Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring, pp. 400-403.

²Winston S. Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, p. 352.

³Raymond Dennett and Robert K. Turner, ed., Documents on American Foreign Relations, Vol. VIII, p. 321.

⁴Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, pp. 365-386.

The conclusions of the conference included that:

The three heads of government . . . recognize that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the north and the east . . . and that the final delimitation of the western frontier of Poland should . . . await the peace conference.⁵

POTSDAM CONFERENCE

The Potsdam Agreement, the outgrowth of an Allied meeting at Potsdam, Germany in July and August 1945, established a council of foreign ministers whose principal purpose was to draft peace treaties for Italy and Germany. It also set forth an outline of the political and economic principles to govern UK, US, and USSR policy towards Germany during the period of Allied control. It established two principles for the treatment of Germany during the initial control period. The political principles, while requiring the immediate disarmament and demilitarization of Germany, also visualized the eventual reestablishment of German political activity under democratic concepts. The economic principles were designed to eliminate war potential and require Germany to make full compensation for the losses it had caused. However, Germany was to be left with sufficient resources to enable her to exist.⁶

It was at Potsdam that Stalin achieved the Russo-Polish land grab that he had set out to do at Yalta regarding Germany's frontiers. The

⁵Dennett and Turner, op. cit., pp. 922-923.

⁶US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 29-38 (referred to hereafter as Documents on Germany).

Agreement did not reach final decisions on Germany's frontiers; however, the decision was made to compensate Poland and the Soviet Union with the territory east of the Oder and Neisse Rivers, including East Prussia. Pending a final peace treaty, the territory was to be "administered" by the Polish Government. A portion of East Prussia was given over to Soviet administration.⁷ The Agreement placed the four occupation zones under the administration of four military zonal commanders (the Allied Control Council) who were to be the temporary government of Germany as a whole.⁸ Difficulties soon became apparent, and by mid-1946 USSR refusal to treat Germany as an economic entity caused the United States and Britain to agree to economic fusion of their zones.⁹

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG) IS ESTABLISHED

In light of the circumstances growing out of the Allied disagreements, the Western Allies decided on the political integration of their zones of occupation. They authorized the establishment of a German Federal Republic which was inaugurated in September 1949. This was a forerunner of things to come, for in October 1949, the Soviets established the "German Democratic Republic" in their zone.¹⁰

⁷ Ibid., pp. 37-38.

⁸ Ibid., p. 31.

⁹ Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁰ Great Britain Central Office of Information, Berlin and the Problem of German Reunification, pp. 4-5.

WEST GERMANY JOINS NATO

As each occupying authority took unilateral action, it became more and more apparent that Germany was being permanently divided into two opposing camps. East Germany, by 1948, had been rearmed by the Soviets and had an armed force of 50,000 men. The West, in 1950, finally agreed in principle that the Federal Republic should be rearmed.¹¹ It was only a matter of working out a political and economic framework within which rearmament might be allowed. A long series of legal maneuvers among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) powers followed. On 3 October 1954, at the London Conference, the Federal Republic signed a declaration that it undertakes "never to have recourse to force to achieve the re-unification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic," and the Western Allies, in the same "Declaration in London," stated that "the achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy."¹²

On 23 October 1954, the NATO members signed the Paris Agreements. Among many other elements, the Agreements laid the basis for West Germany to acquire military forces under NATO control upon ratification of the Paris Agreements, and also took note that the Federal Republic,

¹¹Frederick H. Hartman, Germany Between East and West: The Re-unification Problem, p. 52.

¹²Great Britain Foreign Office, Selected Documents on Germany and Berlin, 1944-1961, pp. 188-189 (referred to hereafter as Great Britain).

United States, Britain, and France had signed the previously mentioned 3 October 1954 Declaration in London. The Agreements further provided that the Federal Republic would not undertake to manufacture in its territory atomic, chemical, or biological weapons.¹³ By special agreement the maximum levels of military forces to be contributed to NATO by West Germany were as follows: an Army of 12 divisions, a Tactical Air Force of about 1350 aircraft, and a Navy consisting of light coastal defense and escort vessels.¹⁴

SUMMARY

The Allied Conferences and the major events which followed the end of the war have been decisive in shaping the Germany of today. In the aftermath of Allied disagreement over postwar policies, the western zones were fused into a political entity, rearmed, and joined in a military alliance with the West. The Soviets maintained their control over the eastern zone, rearmed its personnel, and formed an East German government. The former German lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse remained firmly in Polish and Russian hands. West Germany was bound to an agreement restricting it from the manufacture of atomic weapons, and the Western Allies were equally sworn to keep the reunification of Germany as a goal.

In looking back, it appears that the permanent division of Germany was strengthened by the actions of the Allies in their struggle for control of Central Europe.

¹³Documents on Germany, pp. 155-174.

¹⁴Great Britain, p. 196.

CHAPTER 3

REUNIFICATION: THE ECONOMIC ASPECT

The reunification of Germany will not least depend upon our capacity to arouse political and economic interest in reunification on the part of those powers who are linked with us in friendship and those who still meet us with indifference or hostility. . . . The strong economic position of the Federal Republic of Germany, its productive force and standing in world trade, invests German foreign policy with a singularly effective instrument. Economic power becomes converted into political strength.¹

Erhard, 1965.

The above comment, coming from the newly elected Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, deserves special attention. In the next few years this Chancellor, whose party was just returned to power with more than 47 per cent² of the popular vote in the German national election, will be pressing for economic and political actions designed to satisfy his constituency, some of whom will be pressing for reunification. This chapter will review the significant economic developments in both East and West Germany during the past two decades, and attempt to identify those which have had, or will have, a positive or negative influence on the reunification of Germany.

WEST GERMANY'S "ECONOMIC MIRACLE"

Twenty years ago West Germany was destroyed and destitute. Its

¹"Erhard Outlines Free Germany's Domestic Policy," The Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 44, 23 Nov. 1965, p. 1 (referred to hereafter as Erhard). (The Bulletin is issued by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany.)

²"Elections Return Erhard's Party to Power," The Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 35, 21 Sep. 1965, p. 2.

major cities lay in ruins. Industry was at a standstill. Millions of Germans and displaced persons wandered through a devastated land in search of shelter, food, and means of survival.³ This situation prevailed, in lessening intensity, until 1948.

The year 1948 marks the beginning of West Germany's economic recovery--a recovery achieved in isolation from the Soviet zone.⁴ While close contacts with East Germany and the lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers were largely nonexistent, these areas did provide refugees by the millions who played an important role in West German recovery.⁵ At first the refugees were a hindrance to recovery. Later they became a very important asset in the labor force, especially as many of them were highly skilled and ready to accept employment on the employer's terms.⁶

Between 1950 and 1955 West Germany made steady economic progress. National income rose by an average of 12 per cent a year; exports moved ahead even faster; and new homes began to be built at a rate of half a million a year. This was 50 per cent more than in Britain and three times the rate in France. In five years unemployment dropped from two and a half million to nine hundred thousand.⁷

In 1951 West Germany acceded to the General Agreements on Tariffs

³Grant S. McClellan, ed., The Two Germanies, p. 46.

⁴Norman J. G. Pounds, Divided Germany and Berlin, p. 108.

⁵Karl Loewenstein, "Unity for Germany," Current History, Vol. 38, Jan. 1960, p. 39.

⁶McClellan, op. cit., p. 49.

⁷Terrence Prittie, Germany Divided, p. 31.

and Trade,⁸ joined the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, and became a member of the European Economic Community (Common Market) in January 1958.⁹

In late 1965, notwithstanding its truncated state, West Germany was the outstanding economic element on the continent of Europe.¹⁰ Its Gross National Product (GNP) should be approximately \$115 billion in 1965,¹¹ a significant increase over the 1961 GNP of \$77.6 billion.¹² As a world trader the Federal Republic now is second only to the United States.¹³

US POLICY TOWARD WEST GERMAN ECONOMIC RECOVERY

United States policy toward the German economy has undergone some drastic changes since mid-1944 when Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., proposed a course of action which would have permanently crippled Germany economically. While the Morgenthau Plan was not adopted, the immediate postwar policies of the United States toward West Germany's economy were extremely stringent.¹⁴ Between

⁸George C. McGhee, "The United States and Germany: Common Goals," Department of State Bulletin, 15 Mar. 1965, p. 377.

⁹McClellan, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁰Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. by Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 114.

¹¹Oscar Gass, "German Reunification: Prospects and Merits," Commentary, Vol. 40, Jul. 1965, p. 28.

¹²Helmut Arntz, Facts About Germany, p. 96. (This book is published by the Press and Information Office of the Federal Republic of Germany.)

¹³Karl Schiller, "Germany's Economic Requirements," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 43, No. 4, 4 Jul. 1965, p. 678.

¹⁴Otto Butz, Germany: Dilemma for American Foreign Policy, pp. 19-25.

1946 and 1948 however, it became apparent that European recovery was hampered by the inability of Germany's industries and mines to furnish needed manufactured goods and coal. This, combined with obvious Russian intent to drain everything they could get out of the Soviet occupied area, led to US policies designed to permit West Germany to start rebuilding. This change in US policy, manifested in particular by US economic aid which amounted to over \$4 billion from 1946 through 1963, started West Germany on the road to economic recovery.¹⁵ Since those early years US policy toward West Germany has consistently been designed to raise the Federal Republic to a position of equality and leadership in Western Europe.¹⁶

THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC RECOVERY ON REUNIFICATION

Paradoxically, West Germany's economic revival--revival based on the Erhard principles of sound money, a free market, and free enterprise--probably constitutes one of the basic factors militating against reunification. One has only to place oneself in the Kremlin and then ask what could be gained by merging Ulbricht's socialist regime with the West German monolithic example of capitalistic success. Certainly a Germany united under these conditions would not be apt to embrace Communist ideology. Neither can one imagine that de Gaulle is overjoyed at France's economic position in Western Europe. Since

¹⁵ US Agency for International Development, US Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, 3 Mar. 1965, p. 117.

¹⁶ W. W. Rostow, "A Hopeful View of the Role of Germany," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. by Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 89.

July of 1965 he has boycotted the Common Market over France's inability to influence this institution.¹⁷

While de Gaulle may appreciate the added markets provided by a rejuvenated Federal Republic, he cannot expect to achieve French political hegemony in a Europe which Germany dominates economically. He apparently wants France to become the foremost power in a loose European Community, within which Germany could be controlled.¹⁸ Adding 17.5 million East Germans, operating the tenth largest industrial state in the world,¹⁹ to West Germany's burgeoning economy is not likely to brighten de Gaulle's hopes for dominating a "Europe to the Urals."

Not only French diplomats, but others, are convinced that a new nationalism is taking shape in Germany. As a result of the economic power it has already achieved, they fear Germany will become even more demanding and heavy-handed in foreign policy matters.²⁰ These fears will not abate if West German strength is augmented by reunification.

WEST GERMANY LOOKS EAST

Despite these strong negative influences on achieving German

¹⁷Edward Cowan, "Common Market Begins New Phase," New York Times, 2 Jan. 1966, p. 3.

¹⁸Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, p. 121.

¹⁹Arthur J. Olson, "Since August 13, Everything's Different," New York Times Magazine, 19 Sep. 1965, p. 49.

²⁰Henry Tanner, "Divided Germany Dividing West," New York Times, 21 Nov. 1965, Sec. 4, p. 12.

unity, some positive factors arise out of West German recovery. There are indicators that West Germany's economic boom is subsiding. This might incite pressures which could bring Germany closer to unity. Shortly after assuming office in late 1965, Chancellor Erhard outlined the Federal Republic's domestic policy. He informed the new Bundestag,

Our German concept of a modern economic and social order, after a soaring upswing of what once appeared a miraculous success, now enters the natural phase of daily trial. . . . Our economic situation and the state of the country's finances give rise to some concern.²¹

Erhard explained that one factor giving rise to the economic slowdown was that "The German labor market is exhausted. There are limits to recruiting even more foreign labor."²² It is not inconceivable that the West German industrialists, now subjected to rising labor cost, might welcome an influx of cheap labor that could result from reunification.

Some Germans consider that increased West German trade with the Eastern European states will satisfy their incipient desire for goods and services and pave the way to reunification. This avenue has been tried and continues to be explored. All told, West German exports to the East have quintupled since 1955 to more than \$500 million a year. West German trade missions are active in Russia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Poland.²³ There is a feeling among some of the younger

²¹Erhard, p. 1.

²²Ibid., p. 3.

²³"West Germany," Time, Vol. 86, No. 23, 3 Dec. 1965, p. 33.

Germans that West Germany's expanded economy could be used in the cause of reunification by wooing East Germany with increased trade and credits, thus transforming it into a more liberal regime with greater independence from Moscow.²⁴

EAST GERMANY ALSO GROWS

Economically, the East German state has developed along different lines than the Federal Republic. As opposed to Erhard's free enterprise, it is thoroughly socialist in economics.²⁵ In the first years after the war East Germany was subjected to many roadblocks in its economic recovery. The Soviets exacted considerable damage in their enforced withdrawal of capital equipment as reparations in kind; the broken-down economy did not convert readily to guided socialism; and administrative mismanagement and overbureaucratization on the part of inexperienced party officials bogged recovery efforts. Until about 1957 living standards in East Germany were far below those in West Germany.²⁶

There has been a significant narrowing of the gap between East and West, particularly in the last few years since the Berlin wall was built. Food and clothing are more plentiful, as are other consumer items such as refrigerators and mass produced furniture.²⁷ Not

²⁴Ronald Steel, "Can Germany Be United?", Commonweal, Vol. LXXXII, 25 Jun. 1965, p. 436.

²⁵Ibid., p. 435.

²⁶Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 38.

²⁷Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, pp. 336-337.

only has the Berlin wall slowed to a mere trickle the crippling flow of scientists, technicians, and workers escaping out of East Germany, it has apparently made the regime more stable.²⁸ Despite an inauspicious start, East Germany has built an economy second only to Russia in the Communist bloc.²⁹ Per capita national income is in the range of a third higher than the Soviet Union, and real output approached a five per cent growth in 1964.³⁰

East Germany's economic growth has not been without the help of the Soviet Union, despite outright Soviet looting in the postwar years. The Soviets have come to recognize that the economic value of a prosperous East Germany in the Communist bloc is considerable, and have provided economic assistance to their satellite.³¹ In 1950 East Germany was integrated into the Soviet bloc economic establishment known as "Council for Mutual Economic Aid."³² One of the objectives of this organization is economic integration with each member country specializing in the commodities which its resources best qualify it to produce.³³ East Germany is obviously carrying its share of the economic load. It has become the most industrialized country in the Communist bloc and economically the most important Soviet satellite.³⁴

²⁸Gass, op. cit., p. 28.

²⁹Steel, op. cit., p. 435.

³⁰Gass, op. cit., p. 28.

³¹McCléllan, op. cit., pp. 86-88.

³²Jan F. Triska and Robert M. Slusser, The Theory, Law, and Policy of Soviet Treaties, p. 317.

³³Ibid., p. 246.

³⁴Gass, op. cit., p. 37.

SUMMARY

The prosperity of West Germany has been built from the ruins of World War II, and the division of Germany was part of the aftermath of war against which it developed. Without the division the asset of refugee labor would not have existed. Germany undivided and free from the threat of the Soviet Union would probably never have been the recipient of massive US aid, which in turn led to closer association with its West European neighbors.

Economic growth has developed factors that have served to solidify Germany's division. US policies of providing aid and encouraging trade have assisted in raising the FRG economy to a leading position in Western Europe. However, this position must certainly be viewed with some concern by West Germany's neighbors in the west, and as well as those to the east, when they consider the combined economic strength of a reunited Germany. One might expect German reunification to enjoy a rather low priority in the foreign policy objectives of West Germany's economic allies in Europe.

While West Germany has been growing economically, East Germany, under socialist economic principles, has also exhibited the natural German talent for economic growth. Although somewhat belatedly, the Soviets recognized the value of, and assisted, East German economic recovery. The fact of its entrenchment in the Communist economic bloc militates against East Germany's reunion with the Federal Republic.

CHAPTER 4

REUNIFICATION: THE WEST GERMAN VIEW

No politician in West Germany today who aspires to long tenure in office could fail to propound reunification of Germany as a primary goal.¹ In varying degrees all FRG political parties carry the banners of reunification and return of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse as major objectives.² Most concerned with recovery of the eastern territory are the refugee parties.³ This chapter will outline the official FRG government position and the average German's views on the preceding issues.

GERMAN UNITY: THE OFFICIAL FRG PARTY LINE

The official party line of the Bonn Government is that the Soviets should grant the Germans the right of self-determination and thus make reunification possible. After a freely elected all-German government is installed, it would negotiate and conclude a peace treaty. Only at such time can the final boundaries of Germany be determined since, according to Chancellor Erhard's November 10, 1965, policy statement, "Germany continues to exist within her boundaries of December 31, 1937,

¹Karl Loewenstein, "Unity for Germany?", Current History, Vol. 38, Jan. 1960, p. 39.

²"Highlights of Parliamentary Debate," The Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 46, 7 Dec. 1965, p. 1.

³Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, p. 117.

as long as a freely elected all-German government does not recognize different boundaries."⁴

The Federal Republic insists that it is the sole representative of the German people and refuses to recognize the Government of East Germany. The reunification problem, since 1955, has been enshrined in the Hallstein Doctrine--a doctrine aimed at the diplomatic isolation of East Germany. Basic in the doctrine is the stipulation that the Federal Republic will not recognize countries who recognize the Government of East Germany.⁵ The West Germans are finding the Hallstein Doctrine increasingly difficult to apply, and are giving many indications of an intent to live with a relaxation of the Doctrine.⁶

However, there does not appear to be any significant relaxation in the official goal of regaining the lands east of the Oder-Neisse. At the same time, the Federal Republic remains committed to the goal of reunification. Thus, official FRG policy, bound by narrow national interests, appears to be pursuing basically contradictory objectives with the frontier question only stimulating Polish and Czech support of the continued division of Germany.⁷

⁴"Chancellor Erhard Delivers Declaration on Government Policy," News from the German Embassy, Vol. IX, No. 13, 15 Nov. 1965, p. 2.

⁵Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, pp. 334-335.

⁶"Bonn Seeks Closer East-West Ties with Unity the Goal," The Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 45, 30 Nov. 1965, p. 4.

⁷Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Peaceful Engagement," Encounter, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Apr. 1965, p. 15.

AS THE AVERAGE GERMAN SEES THE PROBLEMS

The German attitudes toward reunification and "lost territories" must be distinguished between official government policies and the people in general. A Western diplomat, who has served many years in Bonn, estimates that the "views of the Federal Republic's government penetrate German public opinion to a depth of approximately fifteen miles."⁸ However, one cannot assume that the West Germans have no hope for reunification. It is only that they appear to be more realistic than the politicians in Bonn.⁹ According to an April 1964 poll, about 55 per cent of the West Germans polled appear to believe that reunification will come eventually, perhaps in 20 or 30 years. Only 12 per cent were resigned to partition.¹⁰ Despite such indications of interest in reunification, there are some who believe that the average West German is almost completely indifferent to the question.¹¹ In response to questions from the author of this thesis, a German friend, a businessman who travels extensively throughout West Germany, indicated that the reunification problem is not of driving concern to the average German. He reported that the average German seems to be resigned to the conclusion that reunification is a long way off and that the Germans have no control of the eventual

⁸Charles W. Thayer, "We Can Now Make a Deal on Berlin," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 98.

⁹Ibid.

¹⁰Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 221.

¹¹Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 39.

solution. It appears that his views were upheld by the German electorate who, in repudiating Willy Brandt in the 1965 elections, showed their preference for keeping the hard problems, like Berlin and reunification, at a distance.¹²

Many believe that the average German is becoming more and more resigned to the loss of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse. The majority of refugees and expellees have become assimilated in the social and economic order of West Germany,¹³ and the south Germans and Rhinelanders know little and seem to care less of the territories east of the Oder-Neisse.¹⁴ The policy committee of the Evangelical Church, which has 28 million West German followers, recently urged re-opening the frontier question with Poland in terms that implied abandonment of the territories taken over by Poland in 1945.¹⁵

OFFICIAL PARTY LINE LOOKS WEAK

Irrespective of the frequency with which it is voiced, or the support which the average German gives it, the official party line appears to have little chance of success. While they operate from a power position, the Soviets hold the key to reunification and recovery of the eastern provinces of prewar Germany. As long as the Soviet

¹² John Mander, "The German Dilemma," Encounter, Vol. XXV, No. 6, Dec. 1965, p. 50.

¹³ Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 117.

¹⁴ Loewenstein, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁵ "Recognizing Oder-Neisse," New York Times, 19 Nov. 1965, p. 36M.

Union is opposed to either goal, their realization is improbable.¹⁶ It is more likely that the official line will decay as the Communists slowly build up a legal and diplomatic recognition of the division of Germany into two states.¹⁷

A CHANGE IN US POLICY INDICATED?

Time also favors the permanence of the eastern frontier of Germany. France recognized the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern boundary in 1959, and FRG reaction was relatively mild.¹⁸ Perhaps the United States should reevaluate its policy in this matter while some political advantage may be gained. As long as the action does not lose Germany from the Western fold, it is in US interests to promote a German-Polish reconciliation if, in the process, the United States can cut one of the main bonds tying Poland to Russia.¹⁹ While the United States cannot come out blatantly for recognition of the de facto frontier, the West Germans might be persuaded that it is in their, and US, interests to convince the Poles that no one in the West expects or favors a change in the present frontiers. The United States could perhaps get NATO to pledge to oppose use of force in changing the existing frontiers.²⁰ A political advantage that all

¹⁶Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Uncertainties," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, pp. 115-116.

¹⁷Cook, op. cit., p. 335.

¹⁸Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 117.

¹⁹Claiborne Pell, "The Present Impossibility of Unifying Germany," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 113.

²⁰Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 20-21.

the West might expect to gain by early recognition of the Oder-Neisse line might be an ironclad guarantee for a clearly defined route of land access to West Berlin and the West's complete freedom to station troops in Berlin.²¹

SUMMARY

The official stand of the Federal Republic is to support reunification and the recovery of the territories to the east of the Oder-Neisse Rivers. It appears that the former is still desired by the German people, although they have little hope for its achievement. The latter objective seems to be losing support of many Germans. If timely and appropriate actions are taken, the lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse might be used for political bargaining purposes.

²¹Pell, op. cit., p. 109.

CHAPTER 5

THE SOVIET STAKES IN GERMANY

From the Communist point of view, in the pursuit of world power, Germany remains the greatest possible prize.¹

W. W. Rostow, 1963.

While the power of Red China threatens the Soviet position of world leadership of the Communist party, it is far in the future. It is thrust into the background for it is far overshadowed by the new power of Germany--a power of the immediate future which the Soviets must blunt.² This chapter will set forth the primary Soviet interests in the German reunification problem and German power potential.

RUSSIAN FEARS

In 1914 and 1941 large German armies advanced from the west and almost destroyed Russia.³ In the present territory of the Soviet Union alone, 1941-45 wartime deaths and the reduction in births together resulted in the loss of some 40 million lives.⁴ These genocides

¹W. W. Rostow, "A Hopeful View of the Role of Germany," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 89.

²Hans J. Morgenthau, "Germany Gives Rise to Vast Unvertainties," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 115.

³H. R. Trevor-Roper, "Recognize the Oder-Neisse Line, But Do Not Yield on Berlin," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 106.

⁴Oscar Gass, "German Reunification: Prospects and Merits," Commentary, Vol. 40, Jul. 1965, p. 30.

were not readily forgotten by the Soviets, and their fear of Germany has ostensibly governed Soviet policy toward Germany and its reunification since the end of World War II.

AS STALIN FIRST SAW THE REUNIFICATION PROBLEM

Stalin, in 1945, was riding the crest of victory and believed he could build a German Communist party under whose touch the feeble democracy of West Germany would collapse--once the allies had left. As long as Stalin believed this, he was in favor of German reunion. Unfortunately for Stalin, democracy was stronger than he thought. In 1948 the Communist advance was halted. Western policy was stronger than Stalin's and it became clear that a "reunited" Germany would mean a "Western" government of all Germany. Because this was a situation he could not accept, Stalin's policy changed from aggression to defense. "Half a loaf . . . was better than no bread. . . ."⁵ and Germany stayed divided.

NEUTRALIZATION AND THE ODER-NEISSE: TABLE STAKES

In the main, the Soviet's policy toward German unity has habitually reflected their fascination with neutralization. Barnet and Raskin quote Eugen Hinterhoff, the former Polish military officer who writes on military affairs, as saying that the Soviets made 12 major offers

⁵Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p. 104.

to remove their troops from Germany.⁶ On 10 March 1952, the Soviets made what is probably their most serious offer regarding reunification. This was the 1952 Soviet Government draft of a peace treaty for Germany submitted to the United States, Britain, and France. The reunified Germany was to be allowed to have its own national armed forces necessary for the defense of Germany, and was to obligate itself "not to enter into any kind of coalition or military alliance directed against any power which took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany."⁷ All armed forces of the occupying powers were to be withdrawn from Germany not later than one year from the date of entry into force of the peace treaty, and simultaneously all foreign bases on the territory of Germany were to be liquidated.⁸

The Soviet policy on reunification of Germany has also been consistently wedded to the proposition that Germany's eastern boundaries were determined at Potsdam and that Germany must renounce its claim to the former German lands east of the Oder-Neisse line. Stalin, in commenting on the provisions of the 1952 Soviet draft peace treaty which stated, "The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers,"⁹ set forth the condition that "West Germany must now

⁶Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, pp. 110-111.

⁷US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, p. 118 (referred to hereafter as Documents on Germany).

⁸Ibid., pp. 117-118.

⁹Ibid., p. 118.

unconditionally accept the Oder-Neisse frontier."¹⁰ The 1959 Soviet draft peace treaty presented to the Foreign Ministers at Geneva was much more specific than the 1952 draft in setting forth the Oder-Neisse as the exact eastern frontier and required that "Germany renounce all rights, legal titles, and claims of the former German territories east of a line passing . . . along the Oder River . . . and along the Western Neisse. . . ."¹¹

THE STAKES GET HIGHER

The 1959 Soviet's draft peace treaty continued to reflect their growing official concern over the military strength which not only West Germany, but a reunited Germany, might attain.¹² Some of the most recent evidence of Soviet concern about this subject and its vast impact on reunification was brought out in a 6 December 1965 interview given by Premier Kosygin in Moscow. In response to questions about Germany, Kosygin expressed concern over "the West German army of over 500,000 built with your US help," and that the Germans "have the knowledge, the know-how, and your US nuclear weapons on their territory, and they are clamoring for their own nuclear weapons." He indicated that the United States was "arming West Germany and setting her against us, the Bulgarians, the Poles, the Czechs, the Hungarians, and the Rumanians." He also announced

¹⁰ Gass, op. cit., p. 33.

¹¹ Documents on Germany, p. 478.

¹² Ibid., pp. 381-382.

that the Soviet military budget would be increased by five per cent "because of the United States policies."¹³

There is no doubt that the Soviets fear a strong West Germany, and Soviet policies since 1947 leave little doubt that neutralization of Germany is their price for unity.

SUMMARY

The Soviet's objectives in Germany appear to be threefold. First, they would like to see the Western Allies withdraw their forces from Central Europe. Second, they want a weak, neutral Germany. And third, they want to insure retention of the former German lands east of the Oder-Neisse which are now under Polish and Soviet control. Without these concessions, it appears they will resist all attempts at reunification of Germany.

¹³"Sharp Interview Given Kremlin, New York Times, 8 Dec. 1965, p. 20.

CHAPTER 6

THE UNITED STATES POLITICAL AND MILITARY INTERESTS IN GERMANY

Official US political and military interests in Germany since 1945 have led to policies having a major impact on, or being significantly influenced by, the questions of a divided Germany and security in Europe. This chapter will trace the most important US policies in this regard.

EVOLUTION OF THE OFFICIAL US PARTY LINE

For a short period after the war the United States subscribed to "Unconditional Surrender." This was followed by a period which can best be described as "assuring that Germany should never again become a threat to the peace of the world."¹ This policy did not last long, since the Soviets, early in the occupation days, made it apparent that they had no desire to cooperate. It was their obvious intention to make Germany the focal point in the struggle for power in Europe.²

Secretary of State Byrnes, in his Stuttgart speech of 6 September 1946, set the lines of the new US policy. It was a policy that recognized conditions then existing in Germany made it impossible for the Germans to reach a minimum peacetime economy. It called for the zonal

¹Gerald Freund, Germany Between Two Worlds, pp. 6-8.

²Terrence Prittie, Germany Divided, pp. 139-141.

boundaries to be regarded as defining only the areas to be occupied for security purposes and not as self-contained economic or political units.³ Through 1947 the Soviets chose to ignore the intent of this policy which might have led eventually to German unity.⁴

The year 1948 brought forth some US policies that would be most significant in later years. The State Department announced that preparations were to be made for the coordination and merger of the Anglo-American bizonal area and the French zone; the Western zones of Germany were to participate in the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan); and the people of West Germany were to be permitted to proceed with the establishment of a democratic and federal government for the western zones.⁵ Shortly thereafter, on 18-24 June 1948, the United States and Western allies enacted a reform of German currency in their zones of Germany and Berlin. The Soviets followed immediately with the blockade of Berlin--a blockade that US policy met with the now famous airlift.⁶ For all practical purposes the division of Germany was complete by the end of 1948.

The division of Germany was cemented in 1949 when, with US and USSR permission, two separate German governments were established.⁷

³US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, p. 57 (referred to hereafter as Documents on Germany).

⁴Ibid., pp. 85-86.

⁵Otto Butz, Germany: Dilemma for American Foreign Policy, pp. 37-38.

⁶Ibid., p. 38.

⁷Great Britain Foreign Office, Selected Documents on Germany and Berlin, 1944-1961, p. 6.

While not admitting that the Soviet action has similar consequences, the Soviets were quick to proclaim that US policy establishing the Federal Republic was an obstacle to restoration of Germany's unity. On 8 October 1949, the Soviet Military Governor, General Chuikov, stated, "The formation of the Bonn Government is intended only to deepen the split of Germany."⁸

Throughout the years US policy on Germany has ostensibly been tied to reunification of Germany.⁹ However, the policy has been reflected in different forms by different Administrations. Early in the fifties the United States was committed to a policy of rearming West Germany within the European Defense Community (EDC). One of the premises on which this policy was based assumed that the re-militarization of West Germany in the EDC arrangement would not further impede reunification, but would, in fact, improve the chances for reunification.¹⁰ Former Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, visualized German reunification as a natural result of the unyielding power of NATO against the Iron Curtain, while in the Communist states, the inner weaknesses of the system would slowly produce an economic and political breakdown of Russian power and control over Eastern Europe. "At this point, the NATO frontier would advance to the east, and West Germany would emerge as the inheritor of a reunited German

⁸ Ibid., p. 125.

⁹ George C. McGhee, "The United States and Germany: Common Goals," Department of State Bulletin, 15 Mar. 1965, p. 379.

¹⁰ Butz, op. cit., p. 50.

state."¹¹ The improbability of this occurring became apparent as the Soviet Union and her satellites became stronger, and America gave up pursuing a policy of trying to "roll back" communism.¹² Having abandoned the "liberation" policy, the United States is tending to pursue "bridge-building" to the east--a policy of trade and culture exchange.¹³ President Johnson, in his January 1966, State of the Union address, reemphasized US policy in this regard. At the present time, US policy on German reunification seems to be to proclaim periodic interest in the goal of German unity without, however, pressing the issue hard enough to bring a violent reaction from either the Soviets or East Germany, and to push the Federal Republic toward a more active policy in Eastern Europe and East Germany.¹⁴

Thus, on the surface, US policy professes to seek German unity, but it does not appear to be as strong an issue as in earlier years. In the joint communique published on their December 1965 meeting, Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson reaffirmed "their strong determination to pursue all opportunities for attaining, as soon as possible, the common objective of the peaceful reunification of Germany," and agreed that "a lasting relaxation of tension in Europe and in West-East relationships will require progress toward the

¹¹Don Cook, Floodtide in Europe, pp. 334-335.

¹²Ibid., p. 361.

¹³Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, "Peaceful Engagement," Encounter, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, Apr. 1965, p. 16.

¹⁴Henry A. Kissinger, "The Price of German Unity," Reporter, Vol. 32, 22 Apr. 1965, p. 17.

peaceful reunification of Germany in freedom."¹⁵ However, the re-unification issue was thrust far into the background behind the problems of defense, and enjoyed about the same coverage as United States-Federal Republic cooperative exploration of space. Also noticeably absent was any mention of the lands east of the Oder-Neisse.¹⁶

United States policy over the years has changed; but it has not permitted the balance of power to shift to the East and, in the process, sacrifice the security of Europe at the altar of German unity.

DISENGAGEMENT AND NEUTRALITY: ROADS TO REUNIFICATION?

One of the dilemmas of US policy has been the question of whether the establishment of a demilitarized, neutralized area in Germany is a vehicle for German reunification. Perhaps, but can the United States afford to embrace such a solution if the security of Europe rests in the balance?

The idea of limiting forces and weapons in Central Europe, or disengagement, is not new. In the late forties some Americans in the State Department thought that German reunification depended upon it. Paul Nitze, who was in the Policy Planning Staff at the time, recalls, "We did not see how the reunification of Germany in a form acceptable

¹⁵"The Johnson-to-Erhard Communiqué," New York Times, 22 Dec. 1965, p. 10C (referred to hereafter as Johnson).

¹⁶Ibid.

to the Bonn Government could be prevented if Russian military forces were not present in support of the Eastern regime."¹⁷ Anthony Eden, at the 1955 Summit Meeting, set forth the broad outline for a de-militarized area between East and West by which he suggested that reunification of Germany could be achieved.¹⁸ In November 1957, Polish Foreign Minister Rapacki came up with the second of his plans for eliminating nuclear weapons in Central Europe. His original plan would have barred all production of nuclear weapons in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East and West Germany. His second plan included banning nuclear weapons of the Soviets and the West in the second stage of denuclearization. The plan did not involve any immediate withdrawal of Soviet or Western forces.¹⁹

In 1957, Hugh Gaitskell, at the time parliamentary leader of the British Labor Party, set forth a thorough plan providing for the following: withdrawal of all foreign forces from East Germany, West Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary; agreement on the level of conventional forces in the disengagement zone; reunification of Germany by free elections; a security pact, guaranteed by the four great powers, between the states in the zone; and withdrawal of West Germany from NATO and the satellite states from the Warsaw Pact.²⁰

George F. Kennan, former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, drew

¹⁷ Paul H. Nitze, "Alternatives to NATO," in NATO and American Security, ed. Klaus Knorr, pp. 268-269.

¹⁸ Documents on Germany, pp. 178-181.

¹⁹ Grant S. McClellan, The Two Germanies, pp. 141-142.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 157-158.

considerable interest in disengagement with his rather ambiguous proposals for disengagement in Europe which would be the first steps toward a wider program for disarmament.²¹

Barnet and Raskin, two former members of the Kennedy Administration who served in the White House and the State Department, recently outlined policies for relaxing the confrontation in Europe which "would be reflected by the withdrawal of foreign troops from Germany, except for perhaps limited contingents of American and Soviet forces during a brief, transitional period." They contend that this disengagement, combined with economic, cultural, and political contacts, such as a federation of the two German states could bring about eventual reunification of Germany.²²

DISENGAGEMENT AND NEUTRALITY: ROADBLOCKS IN THE PATH OF SECURITY

On the surface, the attractions of the preceding schemes for achieving reunification through neutrality for Germany and withdrawal of US troops from Europe are significant, when considered in the light of gold flow problems and pressing requirements for additional US troops in Vietnam. However, the proponents of those schemes appear to fail to recognize a basic tenet of US policy: reunification will not be gained at the expense of security in Europe. US policymakers

²¹John E. Dwan, "The Anatomy of Disengagement," Military Review, Vol. XLII, Feb. 1962, p. 5.

²²Richard J. Barnet and Marcus G. Raskin, After 20 Years: Alternatives to the Cold War in Europe, pp. 92-93.

cannot reasonably consider reunification as an end in itself. Neither can the West Germans, who certainly should be sympathetic with a US policy which refuses to sacrifice European security, and theirs in the process, for German unity on Soviet terms. For, as W. W. Rostow has put it,

In military affairs, the Germans live, after all, on an exposed frontier of the Free World. They understand that the protection of that frontier and of West Berlin has been achieved over the years, not by gestures or by self-imposed Communist restraint, but by a massive mobilization of military resources and an evident will to use them.²³

Security in Europe implies a continuation of the balance of power--power on the US side now provided by the forces of NATO. Reunification is improbable if either East or West will lose significantly in the process. Those who propound a philosophy of disengagement and neutrality appear to believe that the United States and the Soviet Union would be willing to retreat their hard-won positions in Europe.²⁴ While the Soviets might be willing to agree to disengagement, it would only be in the interest of emasculating Germany on the forward edge of NATO. The effect of all of the disengagement proposals would be to reduce drastically NATO's capability to defend Central Europe. NATO forces, in the case of the Rapacki plan, would be denied the support of tactical nuclear weapons.²⁵ Under any disengagement NATO's

²³ W. W. Rostow, "A Hopeful View of the Role of Germany," in Tension Areas in World Affairs, ed. Arthur C. Turner and Leonard Freedman, p. 90.

²⁴ Dwan, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁵ Cyril E. Black and Frederick J. Yeager, "The USSR and NATO," in NATO and American Security, ed. Klaus Knorr, p. 57.

defense would, in reality, be left to massive nuclear weapons. Dean Acheson, in replying to George Kennan's proposal for disengagement, points out that disengagement would leave the military protection of Europe to massive nuclear weapons.²⁶ A withdrawal of US and British troops, leading to reliance on massive nuclear weapons, would probably sound the death knell of NATO--an alliance that the United States is trying desperately to maintain in order to preserve the balance of power.²⁷

The United States has apparently determined that massive nuclear weapons, of themselves, cannot be viewed as a deterrent of Soviet aggression, since deterrence implies a balance of credibly usable power. General Norstad, in his 1957 speeches on NATO, gave evidence that the United States was beginning to discard the philosophy of the Strategic Air Command as the exclusive guarantor of security in Europe. Malcolm Hoag indicates that Norstad set forth two broad total-war functions of the shield forces.

They were to strengthen the deterrent by making it clearer that the main retaliatory forces would be used in the event of aggression, and if nevertheless, the enemy was not deterred, the shield forces were to keep Russian troops out of Western Europe. . . .²⁸

When US troops, in numbers credible for defense, are stationed face to face with Soviet troops, their usable power is apparent and the will to employ them is manifest. There is no question of whether US

²⁶McClellan, op. cit., p. 149.

²⁷Black and Yeager, op. cit., p. 57.

²⁸Malcolm W. Hoag, "The Place of Limited War in NATO Strategy," in NATO and American Security, ed. Klaus Knorr, p. 98.

troops will be returned to the disengaged area, with all the heightened tensions that such a movement implies, to resist Communist aggression. If US and USSR troops were to be withdrawn from Germany, a question would always remain as to whether nuclear weapons would be used if USSR troops were subsequently to move back to quell a 1956 type "Hungarian" revolt. Few Germans believe that such actions would lead to US nuclear response when she could depend on being a nuclear bull's-eye herself.²⁹

This leads to a final factor militating against disengagement in the interest of German unity. That is the strong improbability that a reunited Germany, left neutral, outside NATO, and without US troops and nuclear weapons at its side, would long be willing to be one of the major nations without nuclear weapons,³⁰ or feel long compelled to abide by the 12 division and 1350 aircraft limitation established when the Federal Republic joined NATO. Even today there is a strong element in West Germany, led by former Defense Minister Franz-Josef Strauss, which is showing great interest in acquiring nuclear weapons,³¹ and it is feasible for West Germany to make a Hiroshima-strength nuclear weapon within a matter of three to five years.³²

²⁹ Dwan, op. cit., p. 13.

³⁰ Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 141.

³¹ Anatole Shub, "Erhard is Warned by Strauss," Washington Post, 1 Dec. 1965, p. A21.

³² Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 139.

DO THE GERMANS WANT AND NEED NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

Whether the majority of West Germans want nuclear weapons is one question; what impact nuclear arming of Germany would have on the reunification problem is another. For reunification and nuclear arming of West Germany do not go hand in hand. The interest of Germany's neighbors, both east and west, must be considered in nuclear arming or sharing arrangements with West Germany. France does not want West Germany to have a voice in atomic defense while Germany is divided, fearing that some future Bonn Government might use nuclear blackmail to achieve reunification and eastern frontier revision.³³ For the past five years the Soviets have used threats and all forms of harassments intermingled with offers to negotiate a German settlement in the interest of preventing the Germans from acquiring arms--especially nuclear arms.³⁴

While the Federal Republic armed forces are the largest in Europe outside of the Soviet Union, their size is within the limits prescribed by NATO, and under current US policy of owning and controlling the nuclear portion of the balance of power equation, West Germany is also controlled. Nevertheless, for the past several years the United States has entertained various proposals for a collective nuclear force that would give the West Germans participation in

³³C. L. Sulzberger, "Foreign Affairs: France, Germany, and the Atom," New York Times, 29 Oct. 1965, p. 40M.

³⁴Barnet and Raskin, op. cit., p. 139.

nuclear delivery systems of strategic range, capable of reaching Soviet soil.³⁵ However, there has been less US insistence recently on schemes, such as the Multilateral Fleet (MLF), whereby German crews would assist in manning nuclear armed ships. Chancellor Erhard, in his December 1965 discussions with President Johnson, reportedly suggested joint allied ownership of a small fleet of Polaris atomic submarines. West German crews would not be permitted aboard the ships. This appears to be a retreat from the previous German desire for actual nuclear "hardware" participation in a NATO nuclear force.³⁶ In the joint communique which followed the Erhard/Johnson meeting, not one word was mentioned of the MLF. The essence of the discussion on nuclear participation by Germany seemed to be that "arrangements could be worked out to assure members of the alliance not having nuclear weapons an appropriate share in nuclear defense," and that "the discussion of such arrangements" could "be continued between the two countries and with other interested allies."³⁷ This low key approach perhaps reflects a realization that if NATO is to survive, US allies' and, in particular, France's desires must be considered in the matter of nuclear arming of West Germany.

Neither can the United States avoid some consideration of Soviet interests in preventing nuclear arming of West Germany. US pressure

³⁵"Breaking NATO's Deadlock," New York Times, 14 Dec. 1965, p. 42.

³⁶John W. Finney, "Erhard Confers with President on Nuclear Role," New York Times, 21 Dec. 1965, pp. 1-20.

³⁷Johnson, p. 10C.

for nuclear arming of West Germany could not only drive France and the Soviet Union closer together, it could lead to similar retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union with her satellites and the destruction of the balance of power in Europe. While limiting of further military build-up and essentially US, UK, and French control and management of Germany's nuclear deterrent may not satisfy the Soviet desire for a neutral Germany, it may serve to minimize Soviet obsession with German revanchism and keep tensions in Europe at a lower ebb.³⁸

Soviet fears are probably not eased by public statements such as that made by Franz-Josef Strauss, West German Defense Minister until 1963 and current Chairman of the Bavarian Christian Social Union Party. Strauss warned Chancellor Erhard not to "sell a birthright of German sovereignty" by renouncing the right to acquire nuclear weapons. He further indicated that "only when a Federal European Union was created, with its own nuclear defense potential, should West Germany give up the right to acquire national nuclear power."³⁹

While there is an element of German population that desires nuclear equality, it is difficult to visualize a major nuclear participation by West Germany which would improve the chances for reunification or enhance the security of Europe.

³⁸ Brzezinski, op. cit., pp. 23-24.

³⁹ Shub, op. cit., p. A21.

SUMMARY

Irrespective of publicly announced US policies toward reunification of Germany, over the years US actions have been designed to create the Federal Republic into an economically sound, politically stable, Western-oriented government, militarily strong enough to assist in the collective defense of Europe, but not strong enough to constitute a unilateral threat to its neighbors.

The United States has rejected those proposals for reunification which have as their price the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany, since this would probably destroy NATO and the balance of power it affords. In this regard, disengagement could conceivably lead to unilateral German action to produce or acquire nuclear weapons and extensive other heavy armament.

In retrospect, US policies in pursuit of its political and military interests in Germany have not, in most cases, enhanced the possibility of German reunification. Neither, however, have those policies resulted in degradation of security in Europe.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Whatever policy we may lay down, the art of conducting the foreign affairs of a country lies in finding out what is most advantageous to the country. We may talk about international goodwill and mean what we say. We may talk about peace and freedom and earnestly mean what we say. But in the ultimate analysis, a government functions for the good of the community it governs.¹

Nehru, 1947.

IN RETROSPECT

Viewed from the safety of an academic environment, it is relatively easy to spot those areas of the world where US policymakers, with an understandable horror of absolutes, sometimes pursue a foreign policy of no policy at all. Frequently, it appears that US foreign policy stems from a complete dedication to "moralistic" ideals--ideals which, while laudable, are not necessarily in total US national interest. Neither of these labels, in their entirety, can be attached to US policy toward Germany.

Although the United States made many mistakes in its early post-war policy in Germany, US policy, as it applies to the problem of German unity, has improved immeasurably in the past 10 to 15 years. There is still evidence of dislike of the absolute, and, on the surface,

¹Michael Edwardes, "Illusion and Reality in India's Foreign Policy," International Affairs (British), Vol. 41, Jan. 1965, p. 49.

some clinging to policy based on "moralistic" ideals, the latter of which has the inherent danger of stimulating militant German nationalism. However, despite the outward manifestations of "do nothing" and occasional high level hand-wringing over the plight of the "divided" German nation, the United States is quietly pursuing a policy of preserving stability and security in Europe. Perhaps the policymakers have achieved some measure of Nehru's insight into the objectives of foreign policy.

West Germany today, in tribute to US diplomacy, stands as the model of a working democracy whose government is unalterably aligned with US policy: West Germany is an invaluable political ally.

The United States and the Soviet Union have created strong economic partners, the loss of which (to either side) would significantly disturb the economic balance of power. If one may thrust the so-called "moralistic" reasons for German unity into the background, one might view both the US and USSR economic policies toward their respective parts of Germany as having been successful. Neither East nor West Germany appears to constitute the direct economic threat to their neighbors that a reunited Germany would be capable of doing; both have regained strong and acceptable positions in their respective economic circles, under economic systems satisfactory to their political sponsors; and their economies have been rebuilt under political restrictions that severely inhibit the use of their economic strength in unilateral military forays. Most importantly, an economic balance of power in Europe, and the relative security it provides, has been preserved.

Perhaps the United States has come to the realization that the continued division of Germany, "moralistically" wrong or not, is really advantageous to the United States--as long as Germany can only be reunited on the Soviet's terms. All notions that the military strength in Central Europe can be altered radically by disengagement or neutralization have been considered and cast off. While reunification could possibly be achieved at the price of German neutrality and Western troop withdrawal, reunification under such terms might bring a short-lived peace. Germany has never been content to be a weak nation, and left neutral, outside NATO, would probably start major rearmament. A major increase in an independent Germany's offensive capability would almost certainly lead to increased tension in Central Europe and the inherent possibility of US involvement in total war. Possibly, from the Soviet point of view, this situation could be avoided, and perhaps the Soviets consider that the destruction of NATO and its defensive capability might be an adequate price for the United States and Germany to pay for reunification. However, considering the probable consequences, it does not appear that the United States can afford disengagement and German neutrality and resulting imbalance of power. The present policy of maintaining a credible defense posture in Central Europe, while not achieving German unity, has gained the United States a strong partner in the struggle against Communist infiltration in Europe. At the same time the United States has restricted the military might of that partner to limits tolerable to the Western Allies,

and not completely unacceptable to the Soviets. The balance of military power has been maintained.

IN THE INTEREST OF DETENTE

While still pursuing a policy of maintaining security in Europe, there are measures which the United States might possibly take or influence to improve the detente there. No doubt the Eastern Satellite states, the Soviets, and perhaps the French, genuinely fear a strongly armed West Germany. Lessening efforts toward acquisition of nuclear weapons by West Germany might serve to convince Germany's neighbors that their fears are unjustified. On its own part, the United States should be cautious in attempts to give West Germany some measure of stature in nuclear affairs. Although there will be dissenting voices in the Bundestag, the United States cannot indorse nuclear sharing arrangements which will elevate West Germany to a position where it could unilaterally demand or try to force reunification. Neither can the United States afford to arm West Germany with nuclear weapons at the cost of France's withdrawal from NATO, or retaliatory measures by the Soviet Union. Equally disasterous would be for West Germany to pull out of NATO because of US failure to recognize the West German's desire for some participation in nuclear defense. A very small German voice in nuclear affairs, well controlled by the United States, Britain, and France, appears to be the best compromise for all concerned.

Another positive measure to improve the detente in Europe might be for the United States to convince the Federal Republic of the value


of "trading off" the Oder-Neisse frontier for some concrete gain, such as a fully guaranteed land access route to West Berlin. Even if reunification should come, the loss of the lands to the east of the Oder-Neisse is perhaps the least price the Germans should pay for their earlier aggression.

Lastly, the United States should attempt to deaden the German's hopeful feeling for reunion. The official FRG party line, which proounds reunification as essential, is vulnerable: the average German does not hold great faith in its immediate achievement. The German people would be just as susceptible as any other group to a well laid propaganda program which played down the necessity for reunification.

A COURSE FOR THE FUTURE

In the final analysis, the United States must face the fact that history may divide Germany permanently--unless both countries are willing to accept unity under communism. For the United States to follow policies which recognize the permanence of Germany's division is to embrace an absolute. For the United States to fail to follow such policies, for the sake of moralistic ideals, is to pursue a course not in its national interest, since it must recognize that Germany probably cannot be reunited without serious degradation of US security. The best US courses of action are to play down the moralistic necessity for reunification; to continue to recognize that no change in Germany's political status can be made without effect on the balance of forces in Europe; and, last, to follow a

theme diametrically opposed to the Soviet theme--that reunification will come only on their terms and in their national interests.


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